Syracuse University

SURFACE at Syracuse University
Theses - ALL
Spring 5-23-2021

It's All About the Land: How Plan Colombia Contributed to Oil
Palm Expansion and Forced Displacement in Colombia
Camila Ferguson-Sierra
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/thesis
Part of the Food Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Ferguson-Sierra, Camila, "It's All About the Land: How Plan Colombia Contributed to Oil Palm Expansion
and Forced Displacement in Colombia" (2021). Theses - ALL. 531.
https://surface.syr.edu/thesis/531

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by SURFACE at Syracuse University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE at Syracuse University. For more information,
please contact surface@syr.edu.

Abstract
Between the 1960s and 1980s, global land dedicated to monocultures for biofuels
tripled and continues to increase (Gerber, 2011). While biofuels are considered sustainable
alternatives to their nonrenewable counterparts (Pye, 2018), concerns have been raised
regarding their environmental impact. Some of these crops, such as soybeans and corn, are
known as flex crops, or crops with uses extending beyond the fuel industry and into food and
other sectors. Another such crop is African or oil palm (Elaeis guineensis). Palm oil in its various
forms is found virtually everywhere, extending from biodiesel blends to food and household
items. Plantations have spread expanded from southeast Asia to Latin America in recent years.
However, studies have shown that the expansion of oil palm plantations in the Global South has
contributed to extensive environmental degradation through deforestation, disease and pest
introduction, and extractive monocultures (Alfonso & Liliana, 2011; Delgado, 2013; Selfa et al.,
2015; Vijay et al, 2016; Castañheira & Freire, 2017).
This project builds on existing literature discussing the relationship between the growing
palm industry in Colombia, one of the top palm oil producing countries in the world, armed
conflict, and United States interventions through foreign aid, as the phenomenon may have
broader implications for food security and violence. To accomplish this, I use secondary
Colombian agricultural census data, USAID disbursement data, and estimated displacement
data to determine whether the implementation of Plan Colombia exacerbated conflict affected
violence, palm oil hectarage, and increased United States interventions in Colombia. Compiling
this information to plot trends over time in addition to conducting a single factor ANOVA for
each factor showed that the six-years during which Plan Colombia occurred dramatically
increased annual rates of displacement and established significant growth in palm oil hectarage
countrywide. Additionally, I delve into the current peace process in Colombia, as the impacts of
Plan Colombia are still relevant today.
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Introduction
Project Overview
Currently, Indonesia and Malaysia produce the bulk of palm oil consumed worldwide.
However, in response to global demand for the product plantations have expanded quickly in
Latin America over the last two decades (Bennett et. al, 2018). The oil palm industry now spans
the coastal rural landscapes of Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil (Delgado & Dietz, 2013). Land
converted to oil palm plantations more than doubled between 2000 and 2018, with Colombia
and Peru experiencing the most rapid growth (Bennet et. al, 2018). This process followed a
period of agrarian reform in Latin America from the 1960s to 1980s characterized by greater
participation in a global marketplace through the expansion of exports (Kay, 2015).
Corporations and governments established a series of neoliberal plans and development
projects designed to both expand the area of production to Latin America and foster
international economic partnerships (Kay, 2015; Bennet et. al, 2018). However, much of this
development came at the cost of deforestation and land loss for rural and indigenous peoples
(Kay, 2015; Bennet et. al, 2018). In some cases, companies convince community members to
welcome them by providing resources otherwise neglected by national governments. These
come either in the form of financial support and public services, or inputs for smallholder
production to be shifted away from other crops in favor of palm oil (Bennet et. al, 2018).
Colombia has uniquely experienced the appropriation of land and resources through a
national armed conflict that has lasted over half a century. Forced displacement at the hands of
illegal armed groups, especially right-wing paramilitaries, has facilitated the conversion of
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“abandoned” farmland and forests to plantations. Interestingly, a major uptick in hectarage
devoted to oil palm plantations in Colombia coincided with the USAID foreign aid program Plan
Colombia, which mainly operated from 2000-2006.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationships between palm oil, armed
conflict, and the USAID Plan Colombia. Colombia provides an important case for analysis
because its palm oil industry is associated uniquely with armed conflict exacerbated by
neoliberal foreign policies. It is a unitary republic, which consists of a state governed by a single
central government located in the country’s capital, Bogota. Unlike the United States, in which
individual states have a level of sovereignty. Colombia is made up of 32 departments with
respective governors who do not operate independently of the state. Each of these are further
divide into municipalities. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
“Colombia is considered a middle-income country with a democratic tradition and relatively
strong institutions at the national level, [but] weak presence in many rural areas of the country”
(UNHCR, 2006). This results in areas neglected by the state and makes them vulnerable to, in
this case, hostile takeover by illegal armed forces. I argue that Plan Colombia influenced the
palm oil industry “boom” that occurred in the 2000s while exacerbating the effects of armed
conflict by way of forced displacement in Colombia.

Theoretical Framework
The exploitation of nature for human benefit and as a method of establishing power is a
key part of liberalism, laying the foundation for modern day neoliberalism. In his Second
Treatise of Government, John Locke (2003) asserts the popular belief that nature was given to
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man by God, essentially providing a Divine right for its use “to the best advantage of life and
convenience” (Locke et al., 2003: 111), or that nature itself holds no inherent value and must be
“improved” through human labor to have value. In doing so, humans can claim ownership over
land and resources, and applying labor to modify land or make use of raw materials is a basic
form of claiming or creating private property. According to Locke, social order is created and
maintained through private property and control over resources (Locke et al., 2003). This
notion is not unique to Locke, however, and is used to justify the neoliberalization of nature we
have increasingly witnessed in recent decades. Land continues to be viewed through a
monetary lens and its ecosystem services1, are subjected to assignments of value (Castaño,
2018). In short, assigning value to land and its natural processes imposes economic and political
control and power over territories.
Neoliberalism is a political project that draws from the more traditional economic liberal
notion and emphasizes the concepts of private property or privatization, free trade, free
markets, and globalization (Harvey, 2003). Part of the globalization process is the cooperation
between policymakers and transnational corporate elites (Avilés, 2008). Transnational
corporations (TNCs) further their advancement by lobbying states and creating policy networks
to establish and maintain control in areas of interest worldwide (Avilés, 2008), thus exercising
and expanding political and economic power in a global market. Neoliberalism began to gain
traction as a hegemonic ideological project through policies from major leaders such as Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and is now deeply embedded in modern forms of

1

Life-sustaining benefits to humans produced by the natural environment, such as water filtration and air
purification from plants.
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capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 2003). Neoliberal policies practices emerged around 1980 as
the development plan developed and implemented at Bretton Woods with the post-war
establishment of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs did not produce the widespread rise in incomes anticipated in the lower
income countries. Rather, most countries accumulated huge debts with no growth and simply
borrowed funds to pay interest. A new regime came into being during this time with much less
flexibility allowed by borrowing countries through the mechanism of Structural Adjustment
Programs. To service debt and fund state activities, national governments were required to
cede decision-making control to international financial institutions (McMichael, 1996; Steger
and Roy, 2010).
Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation provides a foundational understanding of
accumulation in a neoliberal regime. The process is characterized by commodification,
privatization, displacement, and the seizure of common goods and spaces for private property
rights (Harvey, 2003). The accumulation of capital itself cannot be perpetuated internally,
however. The issue of overaccumulation, or “the lack of opportunities for profitable
investment” (Harvey, 2003: 139) is a constant pressure on the capitalist system. Simply put, it is
the point at which the continued reinvestment of surplus capital can reach a point where there
is little to no return on investment. To circumvent overaccumulation, the capitalist can expand
to new spaces or open new markets to generate both investment and consumer demand
(Harvey, 2003). Currently, this occurs when actors in the Global North impose trade agreements
on the Global South, allowing for capital accumulation through access to cheap labor and land
and other inputs (Harvey, 2003). Investments continue until they are no longer profitable, thus
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creating a cycle of expansion and exploitation through trade agreements and a growing global
market. This epitomizes the need for capitalism to rely on “solutions external to itself” (Harvey,
2003) to remain stable.
The most widely used method of external expansion to fuel accumulation is
accumulation by dispossession (ABD) (Harvey, 2003), a process in which neoliberal capitalist
policies accrue capital in the hands of powerful entities (such as corporations) through the
displacement of people from land they occupied previously. Dispossession in this case refers to
the restriction or removal of access to resources like land, water, or food, as well as the
removal of property rights (Harvey, 2002; Cáceres, 2015). It can be facilitated through
potentially violent forceful eviction or land tenure disputes involving titles and incentives
(Harvey, 2003; Cáceres, 2015; Castaño, 2018). In addition, “crises may be orchestrated,
managed, and controlled to rationalize the system” (Harvey, 2003: 150). This is crucial for
establishing the biofuel industry under the guise of rural development. Harvey suggests that
government-supported credit systems are used as tools for ABD (2003). In a review of land
grabs in Latin America, Borras et. al (2012) describe the lucrative mechanisms and discourses
used to facilitate land grabs. They state that “the key mechanisms of land grabbing arise from
this: food security, energy/fuel security, climate change mitigation strategies, and demands for
natural resources by new centres of capital” (Borras et. al, 2012: 851).
These methods make up what Marin-Burgos & Clancy (2017) refer to as the expansion
of commodity frontiers. A commodity frontier is zone beyond which commodity production will
expand its level (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). This occurs through processes such as
reorganization and redistribution of product and commodity chains to increase the level of
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production to meet or create new demands (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). However, it is
important to note that each commodity frontier will experience these changes very differently,
as each locale comes with its own specific set of socioeconomic, political, and environmental
dynamics which will affect the ways in which communities are impacted. For our purposes, I will
be focusing on what this looks like in the palm oil industry, which is very land intensive.
The ABD or commodity frontier expansion for biofuel expansion begins with export
states working in tandem with multinational corporations to implement the neoliberalization of
nature (Bakker, 2015), or the “process of reforms and ideological transformations that [seeks
to] implement the doctrine of neoliberalism, [which includes] privatization, marketization,
deregulation, and reregulation” (Bakker, 2015: 447). Privatization, or the shift from public to
private ownership of land, is a crucial step in the neoliberalization process (Fairhead et. al,
2012). These initiatives expand the control of transnational corporations (TNCs) over regions
with renewable and nonrenewable resources, as well as ecosystem services. These once
publicly accessible assets are assigned monetary value, and consequently commodified as their
production and commercial exchange are now additional sources of income for TNCs and the
State, a process of capitalist accumulation known as the neoliberalization of nature (Harvey,
2005; Bakker, 2015). With the rise of neoliberal policies pushed by corporations in the Global
North, the 1990s witnessed an expansion of privatization and marketization of property rights
in Latin America (Liverman & Vilas, 2006).
Socioenvironmental conflict often results directly from these actions and is experienced
disproportionately in marginalized communities. It is especially serious in the case of natural
resources since land, materials, and services provided by nature are becoming sparse in regions
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with extractive development projects. Scarcity is a major driver of conflict because it results in
unequal access and power dynamics (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Castaño, 2018). This engenders
environmental racism by targeting marginalized groups with insufficient power to retaliate
(Bullard & Clinton, 1994). Rural communities which rely on agriculture and traditional foodways
are heavily impacted. Dispossession disrupts local activities and practices of food sovereignty as
well as local markets (Castaño, 2018).
Moreover, the expansion of commodity frontiers also contributes to changes in the
ecological landscape and biodiversity (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). It is not uncommon for
disputes over land to develop, as some dynamics may include the exclusion of people through
legal, illegal, and violent forms of claiming control over land (Peluso & Lund, 2011). These
efforts often operate in the name of development, but are cases where “authorities,
sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged
by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes” (Peluso & Lund, 2011: 668). In
other words, lands once managed by those who have historically lived there under traditional
rights, often not officially documented, were acquired through violent measures or
manipulative agreements, resulting in widespread displacement. Access to natural resources is
revoked and management of privatized land is now up to the discretion of corporations, which
is often supported by the state. Corporate ownership now creates a system in which production
is up to the discretion of multinational actors and used as a tool for profit with little regard for
the ecosystem and the people who once lived there.
While companies and states use a range of mechanisms to make land available for
resource extraction, they all adhere to an underlying theme of accumulation by dispossession
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(Harvey, 2003). Regardless of the method, dispossession makes way for a private company to
establish either a mining site (in the case of fossil fuels) or a biofuel plantation. Biofuels provide
a critical opportunity to curb the detrimental effects of fossil fuel operations and have grown in
popularity as sustainable and more environmentally conscious sources of fuel. Unlike fossil
fuels, biofuels are derived from living material such as plants. Popular biofuel crops include
soybean, sugar cane, palm oil, and corn. However, the demand for plant-based fuels across the
globe has skyrocketed, particularly in the transportation sector which has relied heavily on
nonrenewable resources (Castiblanco et. al, 2013; Paterson & Lima, 2018). Biofuels provide an
alternative to fossil fuels and may produce lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in
comparison. Supplying global demand for biomass or for biofuel requires significant plant
material, and production and extraction processes involve intensive land use. Much of the land
best suited for these operations is often already inhabited or provides public resources like
drinking water and food.
Nevertheless, as with many commercial operations aiming to meet global demand,
biofuel expansion has given rise to a newer form of land grabs, called green grabs in which the
dispossession of land is justified in terms of environmental consciousness. This argument
assumes that local communities may be mismanaging the land and that a private entity may
better govern activities or use with more efficient land management practices. It is important to
recognize that these sentiments are not new and reflect a long history of the removal of agency
from poor and rural communities (Harvey, 2003; Fairhead et. al, 2012). The term green grab
focuses on the appropriation of land under the guise, or in pursuit of, eco-friendly or
sustainable development. In some cases, publicly owned land and resources are taken to make
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way for “more efficient farming to alleviate pressure on forests” (Fairhead et. al, 2012: 238), or
extracting or developing in one area while leaving other patches of forest intact.

The Miracle Fruit
The expansion of extractive projects in agriculture has broadened the use of commodity
monocultures and “[corresponds] with the emergence of a global agroindustrial complex, called
the food-feed-fuel complex” (Delgado & Dietz, 2013: 1, personal translation), referring to
products that can be flexibly used for food, feed, or agrofuels. Crops which are cultivated to
meet production needs across different sectors in this way are known as flex crops. Borras et. al
(2012) state:

‘flex crops’: crops that have multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, industrial material) that can
be easily and flexibly inter-changed: soya (feed, food, biodiesel), sugarcane (food,
ethanol), oil palm (food, biodiesel, commercial/industrial uses), corn (food, feed,
ethanol). It has resolved one difficult challenge in agriculture: diversified product
portfolio to avoid devastating price shocks, but not easy to do and achieve because of
the cost it entails (Borras, et. al, 2012: 851)

Palm Oil: Promise and Peril
The African Palm tree (Elaeis guineensis) (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003) originated in the West
African tropical rainforest region but is now mass produced for commercial use worldwide. It is
the highest yielding oil crop, producing ten times more oil per hectare than competitors such as
soy (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003; Mingorance & Minelli, 2004; Mba et al., 2015; Hunsberger &
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Alonso-Fradejas, 2016), which makes it relatively cheap to produce as well. In the past decade,
palm oil has exceeded soybean oil as the most highly sought oil in the world (Mba et al., 2015).
After an initial three to five years of growth, African palm trees can produce for up to
approximately 25 years (Maher, 2015; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Castaño, 2018) and in a
tropical habitat, E. guineensis promises longer term, continuous production of oil than crops
which require biomass to be harvested or cut for use. In addition to this, the trees’ high yield
and minimal labor requirements after planting makes the industry incredibly profitable (Viloria,
2008; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017).
While the term palm oil is widely recognized and will be used for the purposes of this
project, there are two types of oil extracted from African Palm fruit. The first is generally
referred to as crude palm oil (CPO) or red palm oil and has been in production since the early
19th century (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003; Matthäus, 2007; Mba et al., 2015). CPO is extracted from
the fleshy mesocarp of each fruit, which is up to 55% oil by weight (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003; Mba
et al., 2015). The name red palm oil is due to its color, which ranges from light yellow to red
orange as a result of high levels of carotenoids (Manorama & Rukmini, 1992; Atinmo & Bakre,
2003; Kellens et al., 2007; Mba et al., 2015). It is mostly used for food and biofuels (Paterson &
Lima, 2018). The remaining kernel inside the fruit is the source palm kernel oil- PKO, which is
also about 50% oil by weight. Unlike CPO, which is extracted in producing countries and
exported as product, palm kernels themselves are shipped whole and PKO is extracted in
importing countries (Paterson & Lima, 2018). This colorless oil remains solid in temperate
climates much like coconut oil, for which it can be substituted (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003).
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States, corporations, and organizations argue that palm oil is a promising product to use
in addressing issues of food insecurity, poverty, climate change, and economic and rural
development (Hunsberger & Alonso-Fradejas, 2016; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Pye 2018).
African palm’s ability to produce two different types of palm oils with distinct properties has
earned its designation as a flex crop. Palm oil (both CPO and PKO) is used in food, livestock,
chemical, cosmetic, and energy sectors, making it an incredibly lucrative and highly sought crop
(Atinmo & Bakre, 2003; Hunsberger & Alonso-Fradejas, 2016; Vijay et al, 2016; Paterson &
Lima, 2018; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Pye, 2018).

Food and Nutrition
Palm oil is commonly known for its myriad of uses in the food sector. In its simplest
form, palm oil is used as consumable vegetable oil for cooking and serves as an alternative to
soy and sunflower oil (Hunsberger & Alonso-Fradejas, 2016). Its potential expands through a
process called fractionation, which separates liquid components, known as palm olein, from
solid palm stearin through crystallization of the fatty elements (Kellens et al., 2007; Matthäus,
2007; Mba et al., 2015). Fractionation is different from hydrogenation, which is an irreversible
process of extracting solid fats that produces trans fats and contributes to health concerns
associated with them (Kellens et al., 2007; Matthäus, 2007; Mba et al., 2015).
Products of fractionation, known as fractions, increase the use value of palm oil because
they have different chemical and physical properties than their source oil, and can be mixed
with other products (Kellens et al., 2007). For example, palm olein has been blended with
soybean oil, which increases the availability of vegetable oil in importing countries (Kellens et
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al., 2007; Mba et al., 2015). Palm stearin, the solid fraction, is considered a healthier edible fat
option because its ability to function as a solid fat on its own, means that hydrogenation is
unnecessary, and trans fats are removed from the equation (Benade, 2003; Kellens et al., 2007;
Matthäus, 2007; Mba et al., 2015). In other cases, oil and fractions have been blended to
provide edible fat in infant formula and margarine (Mba et al., 2015). Since palm oil’s low costs
increases its accessibility and utility in making inexpensive products, it has become a more
affordable option as a frying fat in addition to acting as a food ingredient. In fact, palm oil use
exceeds the use of beef tallow in industrial frying (Mba et al., 2015).
In terms of nutrition, studies have shown that palm oil can address widespread vitamin
A deficiencies. It is high in antioxidants and Beta (b) carotene, which is precursory to vitamin A
and provides palm oil’s characteristic red color. Though it is commonly used as a colorant in
food and drink, studies have shown that b carotene can be used as a supplemental alternative
to Vitamin A, and its consumption of CPO and CPO-based products do not have the same
detrimental toxicological or nutritional effects brought about by the overconsumption of
Vitamin A (Manorama & Rukmini, 1992; Benade, 2003; Mba et al., 2015).

Climate Change Mitigation
In relation to climate change mitigation, proponents of palm oil posit that plantations
operate as planted forests (Pye, 2018), featuring perennial green biomass and the closed
canopy that defines a tropical rainforest (MPOC, n.d). When considered this way, plantations
are claimed to be able to address concerns about GHG emissions through carbon sequestration
and oxygen production (MPOC, n.d; Pye, 2018; RSPO, 2019). Unlike other crops from which oil

13
is extracted from biomass, African Palm can produce continuously for roughly 25 years (Maher,
2015; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Castaño, 2018). While yield generally peaks after seven to
ten years because it becomes more difficult to harvest as trees grow taller (Mingorance &
Minelli, 2004; Palacios, 2012), soil does not need to be disturbed during productive years and
additional carbon is not released into the atmosphere. Mills and refineries are constructed near
the plantation landscape, allowing processing to happen on site (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017;
Pye, 2018). With the combined high percentage of oil in fruit by weight, oil palm plantations are
considered the most efficient models of production (MPOC, n.d; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017;
RSPO, 2019).

Environmental Impacts
Despite these claims, the palm oil industry has come under fire for mirroring the
extractivist paradigm of capitalist accumulation through appropriation of land, raw materials,
and the negative effects on local biodiversity and people (Ewing & Msangi, 2009; Carlson et. al
2012; Edwards & Lawrence, 2012; Castiblanco et. al, 2013; Delgado & Dietz, 2013; Castaño,
2018). African Palm is cultivated primarily on plantations, which often requires large swathes of
previously species-rich or fertile landscapes to be replaced with a monoculture. The conversion
of tropical rainforests to plantations is especially detrimental (Paterson & Lima, 2018). Studies
have highlighted the substantial release in GHG and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions
caused by their establishment because they are released through deforestation (Alfonso &
Liliana, 2011; Selfa et al., 2015; Vijay et al, 2016; Castañheira & Freire, 2017; Paterson & Lima,
2018). This is because the higher rate of carbon uptake does not compensate for that released
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when forests are cleared (Edwards & Lawrence, 2012) due to the low overall biomass of oil
palm plantations compared to the forests they replace. Deforestation across Southeast Asia for
plantations is also known to contribute to forest fires and major biodiversity loss, particularly in
the case of peatland clearing (Pye, 2018; Paterson & Lima, 2018). Even though there are
regulations restricting this activity, peatland is still drained illegally to clear the way for
plantations (Paterson & Lima, 2018; Danielsen et. al, 2019). Danielsen et. al (2019) conclude
that it would take up to 93 years to compensate for the sheer amount of carbon released from
forest clearing with biofuel use, and over 600 years in the case of peatland clearing.
Peat draining and removal produces haze and black smoke, raises surface temperatures
(Paterson & Lima, 2018; Pye, 2018). Despite the presence of the RSPO, “subtle management of
monocultures does not prevent the conversion to monocultures” (Pye, 2018: 219) and the
effects of deforestation project are irreversible. After establishment, plantations’ reliance on
fertilizers contributes to the release of copious nitrous oxide into the atmosphere (Paterson &
Lima, 2018).
Between 1993 and 2012, global acreage of palm oil plantations expanded to 18 million
hectares in producing countries (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). It replaced a staggering 270,000
hectares of tropical forests per year between 2000 and 2011 in exporting countries (Vijay et al,
2016), producing about 50 million metric tons per year by 2012 (Paterson & Lima, 2018).
Continuing expansion into new commodity frontiers will only continue spreading the
biodiversity and habitat loss documented in southeast Asia to other regions such as Latin
America (Ocampo-Peñuela et. al, 2018; Paterson & Lima, 2018). In addition to habitat
destruction vis-à-vis deforestation, concerns over GHG emissions and food security have also
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been documented in the literature (Vijay et al, 2016; Castanheira & Freire, 2017; Alfonso &
Liliana, 2011; Selfa et al., 2015; Hamann, 2018).
These environmental problems have been documented in Malaysia, the world’s second
largest palm oil producer behind Indonesia. In 2014, palm oil generated approximately $12
billion USD in exports and accounted for 70 percent of the agricultural landscape (Pye, 2018). In
a review of the industry in Malaysia, Oliver Pye describes plantations as “an industrial landscape
of mills, refineries, ad fat-processing and chemical plants” (2018: 218).

Facing Criticism
Non-state market-driven (NSMDs) governance in flex crop production has developed to
address these outcomes and to promote sustainability discourse in support of palm oil
production in response to these socio-environmental critiques. Third party certification
programs have become a major source of advocacy for ‘ethical’ consumerism through which
companies can continue to encourage sales that fund more ‘environmentally friendly’ forms of
production (Bartley, 2015). As more people cast their financial vote in support of these clean or
ethical products, the resulting wave of “conscientious consumerism” (Bartley, 2015: 31) puts a
social responsibility on the consumer to force corporations to change business, labor, or
agricultural practices to meet the demand (Pye, 2018). Additionally, this perpetuates demand
for a given commodity and justifies further expansion under the guise of ethics.
The current leading and most widely recognized multi-sectoral organization certifying
“sustainable” production is the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) (Pye, 2018), which
has expanded considerably since its formation in 2004. It was initially formed in response to
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campaigns noting palm oil’s contribution to forest fires across Southeast Asia (Pye, 2018), and is
comprised of stakeholders from various parts of the palm oil industry, from smallholders and
large corporate producers to retailers and NGOs (MPOC, n.d.; RSPO, n.d.; Silva-Castañeda,
2012; Vijay et al., 2016). With this range of participants, the organization strives to engage with
voices beyond that of multinational corporations and provide a platform for those impacted
directly by the industry.
Certification for producers is dependent on the following criteria: transparency
regarding management, natural resource conservation, and assessment of social and
environmental impacts (MPOC, n.d; RSPO, n.d.; Vijay et al., 2016; Pye, 2018). By 2016,
approximately 21 percent of global production was RSPO certified (van der Ven et. al, 2018).
Certification allows corporations producing palm oil or using sustainable palm oil as an
ingredient in products to be actors in sustainability efforts. By sourcing certified sustainable
palm oil in food for example, one company may be considered more responsible than
competitors and appeal to consumers making more “ethical” choices (Pye, 2018). As of June
2019, there were 3.89 million hectares of certified plantation land across 16 countries (RSPO,
2019).
Despite efforts to increase more sustainable production practices, the effectiveness of
RSPO certifications has been heavily criticized (Castiblaco, 2013; Pye, 2018). The organization
primarily certifies large corporations over smallholders, and only focuses on individual
processing plants and plantations (Pye, 2018). Another problem with this approach is that an
operation may have a certified plantation, but the certification does not include the rest of the
mills and processing sites that exist on the same property. Critiques focus on the protection of
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primary forests, which are regions untouched by human intervention, and those with a ‘High
Conservation Value’ designation are protected and cannot be cleared for plantation
development. This leaves secondary growth forests or previously cultivated or disturbed area,
susceptible to deforestation. This process does little improve the effects of deforestation.
Instead of a pristine new “forest,” plantations are homogenous landscapes which cause
ecosystem fragmentation (Castiblanco et al., 2013; Pye, 2018), or the division of natural
landscapes leading to the reduction of habitat for wildlife. The remaining HCVAs are left with
substantially lowered biodiversity than the forests that have been replaced (Pye, 2018). Lastly,
issues of land tenure rights and labor regulations are excluded from criteria (Castiblanco et. al,
2013; Pye, 2018).
Van der Ven et. al (2018) analyze the third-party certification programs aimed at
preventing negative outcomes from palm oil expansion, and they conclude that too many
loopholes exist that continue to allow for the perpetuation of extractive practices. They state
that, “simply put, NSMD systems are too sparsely used, weakly worded, and poorly enforces to
reverse broader patterns of deforestation that plague agricultural commodity-driven
economies” (van der Ven et. al, 2018: 149).
It is important to bear in mind that this consumer-based approach perpetuates issues of
power, class, gender inequalities etc. by not also addressing the obstacles preventing
disenfranchised people from participating. Products with certifications are often more costly
and may not even be available in marginalized communities, and these dynamics are
disregarded in favor of pushing consumers to vote with their dollar to create change. The
industry’s profitability does not go unnoticed by state governments and its expansion is
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therefore unlikely to be slowed by consumer-based campaigns (Pye 2018). Since plantations are
suited for tropical regions, exporting countries have access to a unique and important source of
capital, so there if generally strong government support behind palm oil. Since palm oil is so
closely tied to the landscape, corporations having closer relationships with state governments
also includes issues of power and control over lands in resources (Peluso & Lund, 2011). It is not
uncommon for states to grant corporate permits or tax subsidies to help facilitate expansion to
new commodity frontiers (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Pye, 2018). This is also linked to corrupt
or illegal agreements and processes to ensure development in target areas, such as
disregarding emissions, pollution, or fires (Pye, 2018).

Displacement
Many target areas for palm oil production in exporting countries are inhabited by rural
communities which have historically managed the landscapes. To neglect their protection
would be to disrupt a close relationship between people and the natural resources they rely on
for subsistence, as well as the power and class dynamics preventing them from being able to
resist this sort of development. This form of displacement also indirectly contributes to
deforestation, as people are often forced to clear new land to inhabit (Castiblanco et. al, 2013).
Other forms of dispossession occur through smallholder recruitment. Financial
incentives and production targets are commonly implemented to welcome smallholders to the
industry to boost production for export (Zoomers, 2010; Hall, et. al, 2015). However, these
often-informal agreements result in the loss of control over agricultural landscapes, or the
rights to inhabit the land itself. Cases in Colombia highlight manipulative practices in which the
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State encourages small scale farmers to shift production from food crops to palm oil in
partnership with larger corporations (Avila et. al, 2018). Engaging with smallholders is
promoted through discourse depicting the industry as “an environmentally sustainable way to
economic prosperity” (Bennett et. al, 2018: 39). This language has perpetuated the
misconception that palm oil is a sustainable alternative to its nonrenewable counterparts. As
Selfa et. al (2015) put it,
As with any development intervention, policies and programs designed to expand the
bioenergy sector should incorporate systematic efforts to evaluate how development
benefits are distributed and whether any social groups are adversely affected by the
development. [Our] comparative case studies have identified specific negative social
impacts affecting the livelihoods of people in three Latin American nations. These
include increases in food insecurity, loss of income, land concentration, and the loss of
access to land and natural resources, which are especially affecting peasant farmers,
poor communities, and indigenous peoples (Selfa et. al, 2015: 1326).

Palm oil might appear to be a crucial step in solving nutritional deficiencies, increasing
accessibility to a renewable fuel source, and producing many staple products at more
affordable prices. While palm oil has changed a commercial landscape previously dominated by
nonrenewable resources and more agronomically-intensive crops, the supporting discourse
claiming it to be a miracle product is problematic. The consequences of palm oil’s establishment
and expansion in producing countries are severe, and the lack of transparency and complete
information in its marketing contributes to continued consumer demand and expansion across
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tropical agricultural land based on a false premise that palm oil is a sustainable alternative to
other fuels, including competing biofuels.

Armed Conflict and Plan Colombia
Colombia is a critical case for analyzing the growth of the industry because palm oil is
closely tied to armed conflict exacerbated by US foreign policy. Oil palm plantation expansion
can be attributed to Plan Colombia, a USAID program which established diplomatic and military
relationships between the United States and Colombia (Avilés, 2008; Paley, 2015). These
programs focused largely on border control, reducing drug trafficking between nations, and
promoting national security of participating countries.

Conflict Overview
The latest period of armed conflict in Colombia has existed for over 60 years and is
considered the oldest conflict in the western hemisphere (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Over the
course of several decades, conflict generated a staggering death toll in the hundreds of
thousands, many of whom were civilians (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia,
2017). In addition to this, there were massive amounts of forced displacement to urban areas
and Venezuela, kidnappings, sexual violence, and forced recruitments of adolescents across the
country (Bailey, 1967; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees states,
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[The] conflict is characterized by widespread use of landmines, recruitment of child
soldiers, the practice of blockading communities as well as systematic violation of
the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians and other principles of
international humanitarian law by the irregular armed groups. It is also important to
note that income distribution within Colombian society is highly unequal with 62%
of the population living below the poverty line and 28% living in extreme poverty. In
sum, Colombia is plagued by a humanitarian crisis of enormous magnitude (UNHCR,
2006: 2).
Conflict reached all corners of the country and only estimates exist for the number of
deaths, human rights violations, and other acts of terror (Bailey, 1967). Part of the reason for
this is that in many cases, violence was carried out or ordered by people in positions of power
who kept their actions undocumented or unofficial (Bailey, 1967). Partisan rivalry is not
unfamiliar to Colombia, which previously experienced a civil war between the Conservative and
Liberal parties starting in 1876 (Bailey, 1967). In this case, though, the widespread deaths
mostly affected the fighting forces (Bailey, 1967). The current, ongoing armed conflict in
Colombia differs in that it is not one long-term or isolated incident and it also affected civilians
profoundly (Bailey, 1967). The focus of analysis for many is centered on Cold War era conflict
consisting of the organization of armed Communist guerrilla groups in the 1960s (Melamed &
Espitia, 2017), but there are various periods of partisan rivalry-based violence between the
Colombian Liberal Party and Conservative Party providing catalysts dating back to the 1930s
and 1940s (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016; Garrard et al., 2019).

22
In 1930, the election of Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera ended a period of Conservative
Party control (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016). Anti-Conservatives celebrated this
win with assassinations and property destruction erupted in the departments2 of Santander
and Boyacá (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016). The Liberal Party maintained
executive control of the government for 16 years until the Liberal party became divided
between moderates and reformists, resulting in the election of Conservative Mariano Ospina
Pérez in 1946 (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016). Conservatives responded just as
violently in celebration, and partisan conflict began to escalate once more. However, it did not
subside this time (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016).
Nearing the next election, the popular Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who had lost
in 1946, was assassinated on April 9, 1948 in Bogotá (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed
& Espitia, 2017; Garrard et al., 2019; Díaz et. al, 2020). The Liberal Party held a majority and
gained significant popularity in rural areas, largely because Gaitán’s populist platform appealed
to peasants and working people (Bailey, 1967). During his career as an attorney, he notably and
harshly critiqued the national armed forces’ brutal massacre of the United Fruit Company
workers on strike for improved working conditions in 1928 (Garrard et al., 2019). Gaitán was
also a proponent of labor reform and unions, agrarian reform, and women’s suffrage (Garrard
et al., 2019). His death marked the beginning of the period known as La Violencia in Colombia
(Díaz et. al, 2020). The two days following the assassination were filled with bloodshed, sexual
violence, and property destruction targeting conservatives, followed by the almost complete
restructuring of the police to a conservative force to address them (Bailey, 1967). From 1948 to

2

Colombia is a unitary republic made up of 32 departments, each of which has a governor.
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1958, systematic and politically charged violence ravaged the country with approximately
112,000 deaths between 1948 and 1950 alone, and 300,000 by the 1960s (World Peace
Foundation, 2016; Garrard et al., 2019). Another estimated two million people either migrated
or were displaced (World Peace Foundation, 2016).
La Violencia peaked in the late 1940s and early 1950s as armed groups consisting of
militarized peasants on either side of the political spectrum formed and mobilized (World Peace
Foundation, 2016). With the number of these militias forming with Liberal and Communist
roots, the Colombian government deployed the national armed forces to quell the insurgents
(World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Pérez’s Conservative successor,
Laureano Gómez Castro, took office in 1950 until the successful military coup by army general
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1953 (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia,
2017).
By this point in the conflict, violence occurred at all levels. The national army and police
fought alongside government hired Conservative paramilitaries made up of peasants against
Liberal and Communist-driven guerrillas (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Conservative forces
became more organized and unofficial armed groups received government support and even
Conservative local officials mobilized peasants within their jurisdiction to help engage in antiCommunist and anti-Liberal battles as well as further their personal political agendas (World
Peace Foundation, 2016). It is important to bear in mind the importance of the role of the
militarization of peasants in this conflict. With virtually no power to oppose participation in
local battles, peasants were often put in positions to fight with each other (World Peace
Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). This shift broadened the conflict from one of
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partisan rivalry to conflict over land and resources as they were seized by armed groups,
concentrating more extreme forms of violence in rural and predominately agrarian regions of
the country (Bailey, 1967; Maher, 2015; World Peace Foundation, 2016; Hurtado Lozano et. al,
2017; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Civilians were consequently entangled in conflict as guerrillas,
paramilitaries, and the national army clashed on their lands (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). In the
Department of Tolima alone, 34,730 farms were abandoned and the equivalent of 400-500
million US dollars’ worth of property were demolished between 1946 and 1958 (Bailey, 1967).
La Violencia ushered in a new era of terror, with armed groups employing new methods of
violence and fearmongering. Norman A. Bailey (1967) affirms,
Certain techniques of death and torture became so common and widespread that they
were given names, such as picar para tamal, which consisted of cutting up the body of
the living victim into small pieces, bit by bit. Or "bocachiquiar", a process which involved
making hundreds of small body punctures from which the victim slowly bled to death.
Ingenious forms of quartering and beheading were invented and given such names as
the "corte de mica", "corte de franela”, "corte de corbata", and so on. Crucifixions and
hangings were commonplace, political "prisoners" were thrown from airplanes in flight,
infants were bayoneted, schoolchildren, some as young as eight years old, were raped
en masse, unborn infants were removed by crude Caesarian section and replaced by
roosters, ears were cut off, scalps removed, and so on (Bailey, 1967: 562).
Rojas Pinilla’s administration took strong action against civil warfare and violence was
reduced significantly under Martial Law (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia,
2017). A major contribution to this was the granting of general amnesty for guerrillas who
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agreed to lay down their arms, which was accepted by several thousand fighters (Bailey, 1967;
World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). However, violence did not disappear
completely. Rural areas without significant official State presence continued to experience
fighting between the army and armed peasants and guerrillas, and many who were affected by
ongoing bloodshed participated in robberies or joined armed groups themselves (World Peace
Foundation, 2016). By the mid-1950s, conflicting forces consisted of people at all levels of
society and even bandits and militias were working with and hired by corrupt officials to secure
territories, hoard resources, and assure the cooperation of rural people in vulnerable areas
(Bailey, 1967). Farmers were disproportionately affected and forced to give up critical crops
such as coffee, cacao, and sugar, while others were forced to sell their land well below market
price (Bailey, 1967).
Though he is credited for the reduction of violence during his rule, Rojas Pinilla was also
heavily criticized for corruption and maladministration (Bailey, 1967; Melamed & Espitia, 2017).
This resulted the 1957 formation of the Frente Nacional3 four years after the coup, an
agreement between the Colombian Liberal and Conservative parties to begin alternating
presidencies and bring back civilian leadership (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016;
Melamed & Espitia, 2017). This reinstated the centralized power of government in the state but
also sparked mobilization among more radical leftists in the form of newer and more organized
guerrilla groups. Those in opposition to the Frente Nacional felt that the effort diminished
political freedom by limiting the democratic process (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed
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& Espitia, 2017). In addition, the Conservative party began to build strength through the police
and public forces by replacing leaders with their own in response (Bailey, 1967).
During the Cold War era, Communism became increasingly popular in Latin America and
was heavily influenced by the Cuban Revolution, much to the disdain of the United States and
Catholic Church (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). With new leftist movements gaining traction, the
United States increased its presence in Latin American countries. In 1961, John F. Kennedy
launched the Alliance for Progress, a plan to solidify economic relationships with target
countries through antipoverty efforts as well as providing support for counterinsurgency efforts
(Melamed & Espitia, 2017).
The largest of the so-called insurgents is known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
Colombianas4, or the FARC. Originally a smaller group based in rural areas, the FARC consisted
mainly of armed peasants who began to mobilize during Pérez’s presidency. They initially
organized under the name Bloque Sur5 in response to an army attack in what was referred to as
the Republic of Marquetalia in the interior region’s Department of Tolima, which served as one
of several armed peasant-led communist or “soviet” strongholds in the country (Bailey, 1967;
Melamed & Espitia, 2017; Díaz et. al, 2020). In 1964, they were renamed as the FARC and were
led by Manuel “Tirofijo” (Sureshot) Marulanda (Bailey, 1967; Garrard et al., 2019)
The attack in Marquetalia is considered part of the United States Plan LASO, or the Latin
American Security Operation in 1962, which deployed military support, training, and strategy
from the United States to target the republics strongholds (Bailey, 1967; Melamed & Espitia,
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2017). Unfortunately, these targets were also agricultural areas and were decimated by
bombing (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). The other well-known guerrilla force is the Ejército de
Liberación Nacional6 (ELN). Though smaller in size, the ELN was formed in Santander in the
northern region of Colombia and consisted of around 5,000 troops (Melamed & Espitia, 2017;
Garrard et al., 2019). Unlike the FARC, the ELN was not created by peasants and were directly
influenced by Marx and the Cuban Revolution (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). One of the most
influential but brief leaders of the group was Father Camilo Torres, who was a sociologist and
Catholic Priest, but was killed in combat in 1965 (Garrard et al., 2019). The ELN approached
things a bit differently, and engaged in kidnappings for ransom, targeting even United States oil
executives to gain capital, as well as working with narcotraffickers (Garrard et al., 2019). Many
members of the ELN trained in combat in Cuba, and later they quietly gained assistance from
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez (Garrard et al., 2019). During this time, drug-related groups increased
their presence in areas of conflict (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017).
By the 1990s, the death rate in Colombia was one of the highest in the world and still
exhibited gruesome methods of instilling terror such as the “necktie,” where the tongues of
dead bodies were pulled through slit throats (Garrard et al., 2019). Despite intervention from
the United States thus far, the national army and police forces could not suppress the growing
guerrilla troops and opted to increase the employment of the right-wing paramilitary known as
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia7 (AUC) to broaden their reach (Fergusson et. al, 2014;
Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2014; Maher, 2015; Garrard et al., 2019). Bear in mind that the link that
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exists between Colombian national army and the AUC means that the paramilitaries carry out
unofficial government operations against guerrillas, which are often very visible and egregious
acts of violence (Avilés, 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). As such, the national army is
known for being supportive of paramilitary efforts and the narcotraffickers that help fund them
(Avilés, 2008; Chalk, 2011). Since the AUC is not an official part of the national army, they are
able to operate independently and outside the rule of law while the government’s role in
operations maintains a low profile (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). Their alliance with the
conservative party meant that they perpetuated anti-communism rhetoric to defend the
seizure of resources and violence (Garrard et al., 2019). In fact, they produced more deaths in
Colombia than the FARC (Garrard et al., 2019).
During the 1990s, the FARC and the national army agreed to a ceasefire which resulted
in a semblance of peace in urban centers while the FARC continued to expand control over rural
territories out of the scope of the upper class (Garrard et al., 2019). Acreage dedicated to coca
production in Colombia increased from 13,500ha in the beginning of the 1990s to 122,500ha by
1999, and was a significant source of income for the FARC, ELN, and the AUC, as well as cocaine
for the U.S. market (Avilés, 2008; Garrard et al., 2019).
Increased presence of armed forces contributes greatly to social unrest and extractive
measures in target regions. It generates countless refugees who flee to urban areas and
drastically affects the landscapes they once inhabited (Fergusson et. al, 2014). Natural
resources specifically continue to spark tension between opposing parties and are weaponized
to gain a strategic advantage. This occurs through the destruction or increased exploitation of,
or restriction of access to natural resources such as water, metals, etc. (Stevens et al., 2011;
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Fergusson et. al, 2014). Despite the intent of these tactics to weaken ‘enemy’ armed forces, the
consequences are suffered by civilians who may continue to live in the areas under conflict.
Local economies are disrupted while agricultural landscapes are seized for illicit crop production
(Fergusson et. al, 2014). In many cases, increased presence of armed forces may lead to a rising
demand for resources and result in unsustainable and extractive handling of forest products
(Machlis & Hanson, 2008; Fergusson et. al, 2014; Castro-Nuñez et al., 2017; Negret et al., 2019).
Using satellite-based estimates, Fergusson et. al (2014) concluded that between 1990 and 2010,
the intensification of paramilitary presence contributed to major deforestation and increased
presence of coca producers in target areas (Fergusson et. al, 2014).

Plan Colombia
Plan Colombia, a military and diplomatic “counter-narcotics and development plan”
(Avilés, 2008) was introduced in Colombia and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in July
2000 (Avilés, 2008). This six-year program invested $1.6 billion USD and provided military and
police support and training to increase the Colombian state’s counter-insurgency capacity
against militarized guerrilla groups; specifically, the FARC and the ELN (Avilés, 2008; DelgadoRamos & Romano, 2011; Paley, 2015; Maher, 2015; Camacho & Mejía, 2017). These efforts
were concentrated mainly in strategic areas, such as borders shared with neighboring
countries, and territories housing natural resources of importance to the United States. In
addition, the plan included market strategies and free trade agreements between the two
nations to bolster trade relationships and mitigate poverty in rural Colombia (Avilés, 2008;
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Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). By 2005, the United States had sent hundreds of military
personnel and private military contractors to Colombia (Paley, 2015).
Arguments for intervention in Colombia stressed that addressing the largest sites of
coca production would lessen the amount of cocaine entering the United States (Aviles, 2008;
Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). In the matter of national security, drugs contribute to
unemployment and corruption, destabilizing the socioeconomic and political systems in place
(Aviles, 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). As such, it is deemed critical to boost these
countries’ “integration into capitalist globalization” (Aviles, 2008) by shifting production away
from illicit crops through a combination of military and economic development strategies.
Political discourse in the United States largely focuses on reinforcing national security and
government stability (Aviles, 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). Adhering to the militarybased National Security Doctrine of the United States, counter insurgency8 plans between the
US and Latin American countries are often adopted to minimize potential threats entering the
US by building the political armed forces of participating States (Aviles, 2008; Delgado-Ramos &
Romano, 2011; Maher & Thomson, 2011).
Here, activity near or on drug production sites is considered justification to increase
policing target areas, as they are current or potential threats to national security.
Unfortunately, this approach tends to criminalize forms of social resistance and affects civilians
living in target areas (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). The emphasis on border protection
and control also creates a seemingly official reason for the United States to intervene in Latin

8

Per the National Security Doctrine, “insurgency” is defined as the “systematic use of violence to overthrow and
undermine established political and social order” (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011).
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America under the guise of working towards common goals for security and economic
development (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). This in turn continues the extension of
political power internationally, an imperialist and expansionist venture to protect the highly
coveted resources and markets for corporate investments such as oil (Avilés. 2008; DelgadoRamos & Romano, 2011). As global dependence on raw materials and energy continues, there
is a strong connection between natural resources and efforts towards security and stability in
exporting countries (Avilés. 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011).
The majority of Plan Colombia took place during the Uribe administration in Colombia
(2002-2010), which overlapped with George W. Bush’s administration in the United States
(Chalk, 2011; Paley, 2015; Garrard et al., 2019). The initial proposed plan aimed to establish a
peace process with the FARC, promote development in rural areas, and increase exports from
Colombia (Avilés, 2008). The final Plan Colombia included these in addition to input from TNCs
and other corporate actors, the United States, and Colombian representatives (Avilés, 2008).
After the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, George
W. Bush included guerrillas in Colombia on the official list of terrorist organizations and
increased United States support against insurgents (Garrard et al., 2019). Those in support of
the initiative argued that it would help develop a United States style of justice system by
expanding policing in Colombia (Paley, 2015). While the United States made up nearly half of
demand for cocaine on the market, “support” mainly intended to impede the supply of cocaine
from Colombia but were also extended to FARC strongholds outside of coca cultivated areas
(Avilés, 2008; Chalk, 2011). These efforts came in the form of special training for armed forces
and police (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011; Paley, 2015; Garrard et al., 2019), as well as the
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transfer of ground-based radar systems, helicopter troop carriers, and various forms of heavy
artillery; the institution of in-country training programs aimed at augmenting coastal
surveillance and interdiction, port security, containerized cargo inspections, and high-speed
pursuit tactics; the deployment of U.S. special forces advisers to create elite antidrug units in
both the police and army; and the provision of technical advice and equipment to facilitate
ground and aerial crop-eradication efforts (Chalk, 2011; Camacho & Mejía, 2017).
With this, Uribe expanded the national army and police force from 120,000 to 180,000
and 90,000 to 120,000, respectively (Garrard et al., 2019). His work with the United States
earned him recognition as an important ally in the “war on terror” initiative and positive
approval ratings in Colombia (Garrard et al., 2019). Additionally, Uribe began new negotiations
with guerrillas and the AUC to demobilize by offering reduced sentences and preventing
extradition to the United States for fighters involved in narcotrafficking (Garrard et al., 2019).
Despite the plethora of approaches to weaken the drug trade, Plan Colombia failed as
an effort to diminish cocaine produced in Colombia. Aerial crop spraying programs distributed
potent herbicide widely, a form of chemical warfare across coca regions (Chalk, 2011; Paley,
2015). The herbicide in question was the glyphosate contained in the commercial herbicide
RoundupÒ mixed with a Colombian-owned surfactant called Cosmo-Flux 411F, which is an
additive that decreases surface tension and allows the herbicide to penetrate surfaces more
deeply (U.S. Department of State, n.d; Chalk, 2011; Henao-Muñoz et al., 2013; Camacho &
Mejía, 2017).
Widespread application of this fortified glysophate by air has been noted to affect legal
crops and peasants living in target regions (U.S. Department of State, n.d; Paley, 2015). On top

33
of that, it did little to curb coca cultivation even though the United States invested over $8
billion USD into the plan between 2000 and 2009 (Paley, 2015). Despite aerial spraying
programs and manual eradication, coca producers developed methods to combat herbicide.
These include applying molasses to the plants to prevent the herbicide from penetrating plant
tissue (Mejía, 2014; Mejía, 2016). Violent confrontations were also reported, with cases of
armed groups using land mines or violent confrontation to combat manual eradication efforts
(Mejía, 2016). There were 116,000 hectares of land dedicated to coca in 2009 and Colombia still
supplied most of the cocaine on the market (Chalk, 2011). In more recent years, reports of
glyphosate being carcinogenic (Mejía, 2016), contributing to miscarriages, and having
“dermatological and respiratory [impacts] on humans” (Camacho & Mejía, 2017).
As an economic endeavor, however, Plan Colombia greatly benefited the United States,
Colombia, and TNCs (Avilés, 2008; Paley, 2015). New policing and military tactics backed by the
United States supported security in areas with coveted natural resources coupled with policy
networks supporting foreign investment progressed integration into the global market (Avilés,
2008). Global coffee prices had begun to decrease as more competing exporters were
introduced and Colombia’s agrarian sector suffered because joining this growing international
marketplace contributed to unemployment (Avilés, 2008). Campesinos in neglected rural areas
struggled with little to no government support, and the combination of economic hardships
coupled with a declining agricultural sector pushed many towards the more lucrative
businesses of coca and poppy production (Avilés, 2008; Mejía, 2016). Colombia soon became
the largest producer of cocaine entering the United States, leading to new efforts by the United
States to eradicate its supply.
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Colombia experienced consistent GDP growth throughout the 2000s and during Uribe’s
presidency, a quarter of which was accounted for by international trade (Maher, 2015).
Economic growth also coincided with increased violence, particularly regarding palm oil. This
only increased with rising global demand for palm oil and resulted in forced displacement and
violent forms of intimidation by the national army and right-wing paramilitaries as a land
clearing tactic. Abandoned land is then made available for the establishment of palm
plantations (Maher, 2015).
These measures used to enforce and extend Plan Colombia, laid the foundation for the
free trade agreement and the 2008 Mérida Initiative, a similar military training and surveillance
counter narcotics plan in Mexico (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011; Chalk, 2011; Paley, 2015).
The agreement intended to impose tariffs to cover losses from the drug trade and increase
employment (Paley, 2015) and continued to strengthen Colombia’s capacity for foreign
investment and business ventures. Uribe’s successor, Juan Manuel Santos, took office in 2010
and was previously his defense minister (Garrard et al., 2019). Santos maintained Uribe’s
hardline policies against insurgents, but also expanded the use of false positives9 in target
regions, a method often carried out by the AUC (Garrard et al., 2019). In 2016, an armistice was
negotiated and signed in November (Garrard et al., 2019).

9

False positives- the practice of counting or dressing civilians up as guerrillas in order to make it seem as though
the counterinsurgency measures were more successful than they were (Garrard et al., 2019).
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Palm Oil and Exacerbated Conflict
African palm is not new to Colombia and has been cultivated in the country for over 60
years, with plantations on record as early as 1945 (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Hurtado
Lozano et. al, 2017). Development of the industry expanded between 1990 and 2010, as the
country explored new export markets. Colombia has grown from roughly 5,000 hectares of land
dedicated to palm oil in 1962 to 540,000 hectares in 2020 (INALDE, 2019). The first decade in
the 2000s brought a 229% increase in price per ton of palm oil (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017;
Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017), which coincides with the economic growth witnessed during
Plan Colombia. During that same decade, Colombia became the largest producer in Latin
America and fifth largest in the world (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Marin-Burgos & Clancy,
2017).
There is a direct relationship between displacement and palm oil. Palm oil production is
a lucrative business which attracts armed groups engaging in illegal activity (Hurtado Lozano et.
al, 2017). Though plantations require relatively little post-establishment labor in terms of
maintenance, harvesting is an expensive and intensive process (Maher, 2015). It also occurs
year-round to keep up with fruit production, so operating an oil palm plantation requires a
significant amount of consistent capital in addition to the high upfront cost of establishment
(Palacios, 2012; Maher, 2015). For that reason, there is a push for larger operations to increase
production to make up for the invested capital (Palacios, 2012). The industry grew drastically
alongside increased levels of forced displacement, violence, and disappearances between the
1980s and 1990s (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). Each of the armed groups have targeted palm
growing regions, and palm operations have been linked with violence most perpetrated by
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paramilitaries (Ocampo Valencia, 2009). The AUC began to intensify and grow their presence in
areas producing palm, bananas, and livestock, and offered locals “protection” in exchange for
imposed illegal taxes (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017), a violent form of coercion also referred to
as “gunpoint conservation” (Fergusson et. al, 2014).
Rising demand for palm oil brought a matching rise in demand for land, and
displacement became a tool to clear land to secure territory and sell “abandoned” land to
companies for new plantations (Lozano et. al, 2017). As with any expansion of a commodity
frontier, continuing demand requires more land, more technology, and is an ongoing process
(Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). Dispossession of land through extortion, coercion, and violence
helped to secure these for corporate and state interests (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017), greatly
affecting small scale farmers and making it difficult for small-scale palm growers to compete for
land (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). This tends to occur on a larger scale in efforts to clear land
for palm oil than to produce illicit crops (Palacios, 2012) because target areas often have less
government presence (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017), allowing extortion by the AUC and conflict
between armed groups to continue unchecked.
From 1990 and 2013, there were 348,280 reported registered victims of forced
displacement, 87 percent of which occurred during the ten-year palm oil boom. Given global
recognition of environmental degradation and human rights violations due to biofuel
development projects, these crises have created new opportunities for the construction of a
sustainability narrative to promote the palm oil industry. Maher (2015) argued that the
expansion of plantations in Colombia, the fourth largest producer and exporter of palm oil
worldwide, has been facilitated in large part by ongoing warfare. He states,
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[In] the case of palm oil, violence perpetrated by Colombia’s public security forces and
paramilitaries has cleared and secured areas for the expansion of African palm cultivation,
production and exportation. Moreover, these armed actors have created a model of
‘peaceful’ industrial relations underpinned by violence. This violence has lowered labour
costs and facilitated the greater precariousness of labour conditions, ensuring that the
benefits of economic growth related to palm oil are largely realised by palm oil companies
vis-a`-vis palm oil workers. Violence has thus created an attractive business climate for both
domestic and foreign capital (Maher, 2015: 321).
His findings suggests that specific forms of violence in civil warfare can contribute to the
exposure of areas vulnerable to the industry. As part of Plan Colombia, palm oil development
inherently targeted areas with narcotraffickers and guerrillas (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017).
Funding supported “land intensive technology” (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017: 442) for
plantations such as refineries and mills in addition to cropland (Pye, 2018). In the department
of Magdalena alone, 348,280 victims of displacement were registered in between 1990 and
2013, and over 80 percent of them were expelled between 2000 and 2010 (Hurtado Lozano et.
al, 2017), which overlaps with Plan Colombia. The department of Magdalena specifically,
accounted for ten percent of nationwide palm production, with palm oil dominating 62% of the
agricultural landscape (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). Forceful eviction due to palm oil in this
department exceeded that caused by confrontations between opposing armed forces (Hurtado
Lozano et. al, 2017). This is also the case in Indonesia, the largest exporter of palm oil, where
internal conflicts include struggles over land tenure, and many are located on the island of
Sumatra, where the bulk of palm oil is produced.
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Aftermath
Plan Colombia ended in 2006, but its effects are still felt to this day. High rates of
displacement continue, and guerrilla and paramilitary groups are still active. As a counter
narcotics strategy, the Plan failed spectacularly to eradicate illicit crop production (Paley, 2015).
Cocaine continued to make its way unhindered to the United States (Paley, 2015). The real
“success” of the Plan lies in securing territories for corporate interests, particularly in
underground resource, oil, and gas sectors (Fergusson et. al, 2014; Paley, 2015). Displacement
served as useful tool to grow the economy through the eviction of people from land which
would later be “occupied and exploited by transnational corporations” (Paley, 2015: 117) all
under the guise of addressing the illegal drug trade (Maher, 2015; Paley, 2015).
Colombia is among the most biodiverse countries to have experienced growth in
agribusiness, and more specifically, palm oil (Ocampo-Peñuela et. al, 2018). However, the
environmental degradation caused by intensified conflict and palm plantations is both arduous
and costly, especially at sites of violent confrontation and massacre (Fergusson et. al, 2014).
Gunpoint conservation and other terror tactics prevented conservation and local land
management efforts, and many lands seized by armed groups were quickly cleared to establish
ranches or coca plantations (Fergusson et. al, 2014). Current literature establishes connections
between palm oil and violence, palm oil and environmental degradation, USAID and increased
violence, and palm oil as part of Plan Colombia. However, few authors link these connections
systematically.
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Methods
To illustrate the connections between these three elements, I designated indicator variables
with available data to represent each. Displacement represents increased violence over time
because exact numbers of death are impossible to determine because of methods used to
disappear victims and dispose of bodies. Displacement estimates are available through
Colombia’s Red Nacional de Información (RNI) through Unidad para las Víctimas10. RNI sources
information from departmental and municipal governments and victims to provide support for
victims of armed conflict in accordance with Ley 1448 de 201111, which states,
La presente ley tiene por objeto establecer un conjunto de medidas judiciales,
administrativas, sociales y económicas, individuales y colectivas, en beneficio de las víctimas
de las violaciones contempladas en el artículo 3º de la presente ley, dentro de un marco de
justicia transicional, que posibiliten hacer efectivo el goce de sus derechos a la verdad, la
justicia y la reparación con garantía de no repetición, de modo que se reconozca su
condición de víctimas y se dignifique a través de la materialización de sus derechos
constitucionales (Congreso de Colombia, 2016).

The purpose of this law is to establish a set of judicial, administrative, social and economic
measures, individual and collective, for the benefit of the victims of the violations
contemplated in article 3 of this law, within a framework of transitional justice, which
makes it possible to enjoy their rights to truth, justice, and reparation with a guarantee of

10
11

National Information Network within Colombia’s national Victims’ Unit
Law 1448 of 2011
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non-repetition, so that their status as victims is recognized and dignified through the
materialization of their constitutional rights (Congreso de Colombia, 2016; personal
translation).

The data provided through the RNI represents estimates of the number of people expelled12,
received13, and declared14 over time.
As a USAID initiative, Plan Colombia is tracked through annual USAID disbursements to
Colombia via the USAID (USAID, n.d.) as a measure of investment over time. The USAID site
provides data regarding monetary commitments to each country receiving aid, as well as the
actual annual disbursements. Aid to Colombia was documented as early as the 1940s.
Last, palm oil hectarage was available from two sources. Fedepalma, or La Federación
Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite15, a corporate organization supporting the growth
and development of the palm industry in Colombia. They were formed in the 1960s and work
with palmeros16 with operations of all sizes, promoting competitive business strategy,
programming, and market research to help ensure the success of the Colombian palm sector.
Fedepalma produces annual data regarding current and developing hectarage are available, as

12

The number of people expelled approximates people evicted from their lands each year.
The number of people received approximates the inflow of people to new destinations, such as urban areas,
after being removed from their lands. This generally aligns with the number expelled.
14
The number of people declared reflects the number of people who came forward to formally report
displacement. It is important to consider factors that affect the number of declared victims of displacement, as
threats, terror tactics, etc., may prevent them from coming forward.
15
National Federation of Oil Palm Growers of Colombia
16
Palm growers
13
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well as information about processing and scientific research and programming (Fedepalma,
2016)17.
Agronet is the Network of Information and Communication of Agriculture and Livestock in
Colombia through the Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural18, which provides palm oil
hectarage through agricultural census data (Agronet, 2017). I chose to include this additional
source to highlight the difference between available corporate and state information, as the
data provided by the Ministerio are notably different than that of Fedepalma (Figure 4), and
national data are available beginning in 1987. This is likely because the agricultural census in
Colombia was inconsistently conducted over several years (Acosta Moreno & Pérez Gómez,
2011).
To demonstrate the impact of Plan Colombia, I chose to include national data extending
beyond the six years of the program, both before and after the period 2000 to 2006. Available
data from these sources extended from 1985 to 2019 (Table 1, below), which allows us to view
trends prior to, during, and after Plan Colombia.

17

While Fedepalma offers spreadsheets of data on palm hectarage, there are also PDF files which include graphs as
well as annual hectarage. When downloading an Excel data file for the given date range, I discovered that the first
several numbers were inconsistent with the PDF files. The hectarage reflected in this dataset has been compiled
from the PDF versions of the data, for which users must manually enter date ranges and download the
corresponding PDF files (Fedepalma, 2016).
18

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
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Year

USAID Investment
(USD)

Palm Oil (established + in
development) (ha)
FEDEPALMA

1985
1986

24,880,769.00
25,323,190.00

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

26,384,846.00
27,745,745.00
131,500,603.00
198,755,919.00
129,418,062.00
138,115,251.00
133,054,319.00
48,564,887.00
44,602,037.00
32,152,842.00
158,191,051.00
172,758,898.00
478,968,756.00
1,684,925,135.00
371,670,209.00
740,714,176.00
934,282,778.00
836,099,283.00
902,370,725.00
1,528,288,974.00
460,958,881.00
853,052,302.00
1,018,057,221.00
928,610,882.00
454,191,714.00
784,088,686.00
279,390,746.00
610,249,639.00
899,215,689.00
346,191,271.00
551,965,767.00

78,396.00
94,412.00
103,396.00
111,380.00
116,694.00
120,942.00
123,070.00
125,856.00
130,400.00
135,459.00
134,648.00
144,589.00
150,851.00
158,019.00
175,455.00
194,431.00
211,265.00
229,199.00
259,751.00
291,831.00
307,482.00
325,327.00
352,004.00
379,611.00
405,656.00
426,795.00
456,419.00
470,219.00
487,748.00
505,966.00
523,458.00

2018
2019

526,211,671.00
800,747,494.00

547,756.00
568,386.00

MinAg

51,560.00
62,870.00
76,135.00
89,671.00
97,604.00
108,510.00
113,395.00
125,321.00
131,067.00
133,688.00
145,134.00
147,493.00
148,644.00
147,439.00
154,331.00
155,208.00
167,361.00
180,227.00
192,970.00
208,875.00
221,601.00
246,586.00
258,907.00
284,241.00
334,416.00
344,643.00
379,966.00
430,634.00
479,663.00
498,962.00
528,351.00

Displacement
Expelled

Received

Declared

14,666
16,281

11,526
13,245

2
2

20,085
34,451
30,760
39,483
34,723
45,978
51,605
56,119
109,457
142,035
254,050
247,208
281,308
607,563
666,436
772,255
466,396
425,706
485,386
464,755
484,840
427,360
257,486
200,669
239,473
240,892
260,706
251,796
188,847
104,263
98,576

15,943
26,607
23,962
32,343
28,818
38,232
43,402
46,565
93,793
114,442
218,954
222,787
235,501
584,634
647,385
745,023
448,963
418,294
477,586
471,917
494,287
453,059
283,009
219,259
250,497
223,524
251,858
252,612
177,345
94,032
83,226

2
8
25
281
4
25
4
31
356
3,481
16,305
61,637
50,907
331,175
443,459
529,087
277,477
258,238
317,534
382,675
466,536
524,143
448,932
395,422
453,077
536,952
741,152
783,887
690,853
143,191
137,457

137,909
74,772

115,323
61,609

161,631
101,499

Table 1. Compiled USAID, Palm Oil hectarage, and National Displacement data from 1987-2019 (Fedepalma, 2016; Agronet,
2017; Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020; USAID, n.d.)

To accommodate outliers and better represent the trend of USAID investment over time, I also
created a chart of 3-year averages, consisting of the mean of a given year and the two before it
(Table 2, below). After compiling data, I plotted each variable over time.
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Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

3 Year Avg. USAID
(USD)
25,529,601.67
26,484,593.67
61,877,064.67
119,334,089.00
153,224,861.33
155,429,744.00
133,529,210.67
106,578,152.33
75,407,081.00
41,773,255.33
78,315,310.00
121,034,263.67
269,972,901.67
778,884,263.00
845,188,033.33
932,436,506.67
682,222,387.67
837,032,079.00
890,917,595.33
1,088,919,660.67
963,872,860.00
947,433,385.67
777,356,134.67
933,240,135.00
800,286,605.67
722,297,094.00
505,890,382.00
557,909,690.33
596,285,358.00
618,552,199.67
599,124,242.33
539,088,719.00
626,308,310.67
557,359,194.00

Table 2. 3-year Average of annual USAID disbursements

Additionally, I conducted a one-way or single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA), which
is a method used to compare the means of samples across separate groups (Babbie, 2013;
Christensen, 2018; Hess & Hess, 2018). In other words, the mean of each group is compared to
its counterparts to determine whether the groups are statistically significant or independent
from one another. In this case, I sought to compare displacement, USAID funding, and palm oil
hectarage data pre-Plan Colombia (1985-1999), during Plan Colombia (2000-2006), and postPlan Colombia (2007-2019). A significant difference between the means of these periods would

44
show whether the years of Plan Colombia indicate that Plan Colombia may have impacted or
influenced changes in displacement and palm oil hectarage. A Tukey Test would have provided
the exact differences between the means of each time period, but it requires equal
observations across the groups, which were not available for this dataset.

Results
USAID
Though USAID investment in Colombia existed prior to Plan Colombia the
implementation of the program greatly increased annual disbursements over time (Figure 1,
Figure 2). Between just 2000 and 2006, USAID under Plan Colombia exceeded $6.9 billion USD,
a drastic change from the $1.7 billion invested from 1985 to 1999 (Table 3). The trend of higher
disbursements continues after 2006, with over $8.8 billion USD invested through 201919. This
supports that Plan Colombia not only increased United States investment in Colombia, but also
that it set a precedent for additional funding and a closer financial relationship between the
two countries.

19

$1 U.S. in 1985 equaled $1.60 U.S. in 2000 and $2.46 in 2019. These are increases of 60% and 238%
respectively. USAID expenditures increased approximately 2900% from 1985 to 2000 and 2042% from
1985 to 2019 (calculated via https://www.in2013dollars.com/).
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USAID Investment in Colombia
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Figure 1. USAID Investment (USD) 1985-2019

Total USAID (USD)
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) Plan Colombia (2000-2006) Post-Plan (2007-2019)
24,880,769.00
1,684,925,135.00
460,958,881.00
25,323,190.00
371,670,209.00
853,052,302.00
26,384,846.00
740,714,176.00
1,018,057,221.00
27,745,745.00
934,282,778.00
928,610,882.00
131,500,603.00
836,099,283.00
454,191,714.00
198,755,919.00
129,418,062.00

902,370,725.00
1,528,288,974.00

138,115,251.00

610,249,639.00

133,054,319.00
48,564,887.00
44,602,037.00
32,152,842.00
158,191,051.00

899,215,689.00

346,191,271.00
551,965,767.00
526,211,671.00
800,747,494.00
345,118,417.00

172,758,898.00
478,968,756.00

Total

1,770,417,175.00

784,088,686.00
279,390,746.00

6,998,351,280.00

8,858,050,380.00

Table 3. USAID Investment (USD) Pre-Plan Colombia, During Plan Colombia, and Post-Plan Colombia
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3 Year Avg. USAID (USD)
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Figure 2. 3-Year Averages, USAID Investment (USD) Over Time

3 Yr Avg USAID (USD)

Total

Pre-Plan (1985-1999) Plan Colombia (2000-2006) Post-Plan (2007-2019)
25,529,601.67
778,884,263.00
963,872,860.00
26,484,593.67
845,188,033.33
947,433,385.67
61,877,064.67
932,436,506.67
777,356,134.67
119,334,089.00
682,222,387.67
933,240,135.00
153,224,861.33
837,032,079.00
800,286,605.67
155,429,744.00
890,917,595.33
722,297,094.00
133,529,210.67
1,088,919,660.67
505,890,382.00
106,578,152.33
557,909,690.33
75,407,081.00
596,285,358.00
41,773,255.33
618,552,199.67
78,315,310.00
599,124,242.33
121,034,263.67
539,088,719.00
269,972,901.67
626,308,310.67
557,359,194.00
1,368,490,129.00
6,055,600,525.67
9,745,004,311.00

Table 4. 3-Year Average USAID Investment (USD) Pre-Plan Colombia, During Plan Colombia, and Post-Plan Colombia

The single factor ANOVA for USAID and the 3-year averages show that there are
significant differences between disbursements before, during, and after Plan Colombia at a
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confidence level of 0.05, with p-values of 2.6006E-08 and 7.6147E-15, respectively (Table 5,
Table 6).
SUMMARY: USAID
Groups
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)
During Plan (2000-2006)
Post-Plan (2007-2019)

Count
15
7
14

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
4.17962E+18
2.22086E+18

Total

6.40048E+18

Sum
Average
Variance
1770417175 118027812 1.384E+16
6998351280 999764469 2.0849E+17
8858050380 632717884 5.9704E+16

df

MS
F
P-value
F crit
2 2.0898E+18 31.0527878 2.6006E-08 3.28491765
33 6.7299E+16
35

Table 5. USAID Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05
SUMMARY: USAID 3-Year Average
Groups
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)
During Plan (2000-2006)
Post-Plan (2007-2019)

Count
13
7
14

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
3.49596E+18
4.89325E+17

Total

3.98528E+18

Sum
Average
Variance
1368490129 105268471 4.4407E+15
6055600526 865085789 1.6226E+16
9745004311 696071737 2.6052E+16

df

MS
F
P-value
F crit
2 1.748E+18 110.738937 7.6146E-15 3.30481725
31 1.5785E+16
33

Table 6. USAID 3-Year Avg. Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05

Palm Oil
Though palm oil plantations have existed in Colombia for decades, hectarage began to
increase faster during Plan Colombia. This is the case in the data for both Fedepalma and
Agronet (Figure 3), despite Agronet reporting lower numbers. Note that the data from
Fedepalma includes plantations in development in addition to those already established.
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Palm Oil (ha)
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Figure 3. Palm oil hectarage 1987-2019 (Fedepalma, 2016; Agronet, 2017)

FEDEPALMA (ha)
Pre-Plan Colombia Plan Colombia Post-Plan Colombia
78,396
94,412
103,396
111,380

158,019
175,455
194,431
211,265

307,482
325,327
352,004
379,611

116,694
120,942

229,199
259,751

405,656
426,795

123,070

291,831

456,419

125,856
130,400
135,459
134,648
144,589

470,219
487,748
505,966
523,458

150,851

Total

1,570,093

1,519,951

4,640,685

Table 7. Palm oil hectarage (current and in development) pre-Plan Colombia (1987-1999), during Plan Colombia (2000-2006),
and post-Plan Colombia (2007-2017) (Fedepalma, 2016)
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Agronet (ha)
Pre-Plan Colombia Plan Colombia Post-Plan Colombia
51,560
62,870
76,135

147,439
154,331
155,208

221,601
246,586
258,907

89,671
97,604

167,361
180,227

284,241
334,416

108,510

192,970

344,643

113,395
125,321
131,067
133,688
145,134

208,875

379,966
430,634
479,663
498,962
528,351

1,206,411

4,007,970

147,493
148,644

Total

1,431,092

Table 8. Palm oil hectarage pre-Plan Colombia (1987-1999), during Plan Colombia (2000-2006), and post-Plan Colombia (20072017) (Agronet, 2017)

The single factor ANOVA for palm oil hectarage, as reported by both Agronet and
Fedepalma, showed a significant difference between the means of each period at a 0.05 level of
confidence. The p-values for Fedepalma and Agronet were 9.043E-14 and 3.205E-09,
respectively (Table 9, Table 10).
SUMMARY: Fedepalma
Groups
Count
Pre-Plan Colombia
13
Plan Colombia
7
Post-Plan Colombia
11

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
5.496E+11
7.2847E+10

Total

6.2245E+11

Sum
Average
Variance
1570093 120776.3846 408453505.8
1519951 217135.8571 2220501389
4640685 421880.4545 5462282369

df

MS
F
2 2.74802E+11 105.6244562
28 2601688361
30

Table 9. Fedepalma Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05

P-value
F crit
9.043E-14 5.45293692
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SUMMARY: Agronet
Groups
Pre-Plan Colombia
Plan Colombia
Post-Plan Colombia

Count
13
7
11

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
4.0122E+11
1.3184E+11

Total

5.3305E+11

Sum
Average
Variance
1431092
110084 1061420566
1206411 172344.4286
514214584
4007970 364360.9091 11601695835

df

MS
F
2 2.00608E+11 42.60502443
28 4708546166

P-value
F crit
3.205E-09 5.45293692

30

Table 10. Agronet Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05

Displacement
Annual displacement, specifically the numbers of people expelled and received, as
declared as reported by the Unidad Para Las Víctimas (2020) exponentially increased beginning
in 1999 and continued at higher rates during Plan Colombia. After 2006, these numbers
decreased considerably (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Annual Displacement: # of people expelled, received, and declared (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020)

According to the data provided by Unidad Para Las Víctimas (2020), the estimated
numbers of people expelled and received across the country skyrocketed at the start of Plan
Colombia and more than doubled during Plan Colombia, when compared to previous years.
Both remained at higher rates in subsequent years (Figure 4, Table 11, Table 12). Conversely,
while the number of declared victims dramatically increased during Plan Colombia, it soared to
almost 5.6 million after Plan Colombia (Figure 4, Table 13).
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# Expelled
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)

Total

Plan Colombia (2000-2006)

Post-Plan (2007-2019)

14,666
16,281

607,563
666,436

484,840
427,360

20,085

772,255

257,486

34,451

466,396

200,669

30,760

425,706

239,473

39,483

485,386

240,892

34,723

464,755

260,706

45,978
51,605

251,796
188,847

56,119

104,263

109,457
142,035
254,050
247,208
281,308

98,576
137,909
74,772

1,378,209

3,888,497

2,967,589

Table 11. Number of people expelled pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia (Unidad Para Las
Víctimas, 2020)
# Received
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)

Total

Plan Colombia (2000-2006)

Post-Plan (2007-2019)

11,526
13,245

584,634
647,385

494,287
453,059

15,943

745,023

283,009

26,607
23,962
32,343
28,818

448,963
418,294
477,586
471,917

219,259
250,497
223,524
251,858

38,232
43,402

252,612
177,345

46,565

94,032

93,793
114,442
218,954
222,787
235,501

83,226
115,323
61,609

1,166,120

3,793,802

2,959,640

Table 12. Number of people received pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia (Unidad Para Las
Víctimas, 2020)
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# Declared
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)

Total

Plan Colombia (2000-2006)

Post-Plan (2007-2019)

2
2

331,175
443,459

466,536
524,143

2

529,087

448,932

8
25
281
4

277,477
258,238
317,534
382,675

395,422
453,077
536,952
741,152

25
4

783,887
690,853

31

143,191

356
3,481
16,305
61,637
50,907

137,457
161,631
101,499

133,070

2,539,645

5,584,732

Table 13. Number of people declared pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia (Unidad Para Las
Víctimas, 2020)

Last, the single factor ANOVA for each of the three displacement variables showed
significant differences between the means of estimates pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan
Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia at a 0.05 level of confidence. The p-values for the number of
expelled and received people were 1.3894E-09 and 1.03E-09, respectively (Table 14, Table 15).
The p-value for the number of declared victims of displacement was 3.9932E-08 (Table 16).
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SUMMARY: # of People Expelled
Groups
Count
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)

15

Sum
1378209

Average
Variance
91880.6 8858507306

7

3888497

555499.5714 1.6656E+10

Post-Plan (2007-2019)

13

2967589

228276.0769 1.4537E+10

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
1.02687E+12
3.98406E+11

Total

1.42528E+12

During Plan (2000-2006)

df
2
32

MS
F
P-value
F crit
5.13436E+11 41.2392631 1.3894E-09 3.29453682
12450180557

34

Table 14. Single Factor ANOVA: # of people Expelled (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020)

SUMMARY: # of People Received
Groups
Count
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)
During Plan (2000-2006)
Post-Plan (2007-2019)

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

15
7
13

SS
1.02861E+12
3.88888E+11

Sum
1166120
3793802
2959640

df
2
32

1.4175E+12

Average
Variance
77741.33333 6679202167
541971.7143 1.4527E+10
227664.6154 1.7351E+10

MS
F
5.14305E+11 42.3200455
12152748778

P-value
F crit
1.03E-09 3.29453682

34

Table 15. Single Factor ANOVA: # of people Received (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020)

SUMMARY: # of People Declared
Groups
Count
Pre-Plan (1985-1999)
During Plan (2000-2006)
Post-Plan (2007-2019)

15
7
13

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
1.3736E+12
7.22895E+11

Total

2.09649E+12

Sum
133070
2539645
5584732

df
2
32

Average
Variance
8871.333333 392022321
362806.4286 9302438923
429594.7692 5.5133E+10

MS
F
P-value
F crit
6.86798E+11 30.4021072 3.9932E-08 3.29453682
22590482248

34

Table 16. Single Factor ANOVA: # of people Declared (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020)
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The One-way ANOVA results align with the plots over time. Therefore, Plan Colombia
significantly influenced the financial relationship between the United States and Colombia.
USAID investment was lower and significantly different prior to the program’s implementation
and continued to increase after the program’s end. Palm oil hectarage and displacement were
both significantly different across each period, and drastically increased during Plan Colombia.
The continuing trends post-Plan Colombia indicate that the program did in fact have an
important impact which continues to influence the political and economic relationship between
the two countries.

Discussion
While most research regarding the impacts of palm oil focuses on environmental
degradation and market-based campaigns to promote sustainability discourse, it is important to
assess the ways in which government-supported violence, especially as part of United Statessupported efforts to combat the illegal drug trade, create space for expanding plantations
which in turn exacerbate tensions over land and resources. Current events are paving the way
for new conversations regarding the connections between palm oil, USAID and United States
interventions, and armed conflict.
Plan Colombia was initially a six-year program, but it established a closer relationship
between Colombia and the United States which still exists today. Trends after 2006 correspond
with the ongoing relationship between the United States and Colombia, with Plan Colombia
laying a foundation for new initiatives and recommendations by the U.S. government. Colombia
has since embarked on an internationally recognized and official peace process with the FARC,
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in which the guerrillas agreed to demobilize and forfeit their arms to the United Nations in 2016
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). Other stipulations include the Colombian government
agreeing to not extradite FARC leaders to the United States to face punishment for their crimes.
United States government officials have referred to Plan Colombia as a point of pride for laying
the foundation for this agreement while also allowed for the continued cooperation between
the two nations (Corker et. al, 2017). In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women’s Issues under the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate,
Senator Marco Rubio stated

The result of it is the Colombian military is now the best armed and trained in Latin
America. It is a reliable security partner for the United States. It is also exporting its
expertise to help build the capacity and the capability of other countries in the region,
particularly in Central America (Corker et. al, 2017).

Rubio credits Colombia’s latest peace process, which began in 2012, to Plan Colombia’s
“success.” In another subcommittee hearing under the Committee of Foreign Affairs,
Congressman Jeff Duncan urged Colombia to overturn the decision to end aerial crop spraying
methods and to not extradite FARC leaders to the United States because they threatened to
undo progress made under Plan Colombia, warning
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We stand with you in your pursuit of peace, but do not give up the military successes we
have achieved together at the negotiating table (Royce et. al, 2015)

Efforts made have been repeatedly applauded by the United States government, as
noted in these subcommittee hearings from the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Relations. It is no secret that the FARC is the largest of the guerrilla organizations fighting in the
ongoing conflict, but this apparent scapegoating tactic completely removes acts of terror and
human rights violations committed by right-wing paramilitaries, which may only be mentioned
once or twice in hearings (Royce et. al, 2015; Corker et. al, 2017). In fact, the disregard for
paramilitarism extended to declarations that it ended altogether, courtesy of former President
Uribe stating that only guerrillas and narcotraffickers remained in Colombia after Plan Colombia
(Maher & Thomson, 2011).

USAID and the Peace Process- Has it worked?
To complement the peace agreement, the Obama and Manuel Santos administrations
negotiated various aid packages to be sent to Colombia to support a new initiative called Peace
Colombia, requesting $390 million to $450 million USD (Office of the Press Secretary, 2016),
which includes the Economic Support Funds (ESF) program through USAID for $187.3 million
USD (Isacson, 2016). The Washington Office on Latin America reported that ESF
would support the Colombian government’s “Territorial Peace” efforts to establish a
state presence in historically abandoned parts of the country, as well as programs for
victims, ethnic minorities, the justice system, human rights, and peacebuilding. While
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programs like these are necessary for Colombia’s post-conflict success, ESF would only
increase by US$46 million over 2016 levels, to a total that is lower than this account was
in 2008-2010. The ESF component of the aid package is, frankly, too low (Isacson, 2016).
Since embarking on this journey, however, other armed groups have occupied space
abandoned by those who laid down their arms, followed by former combatants taking up arms
once again. Dispossession is still used as a method of gaining control over land, especially by
paramilitaries (Maher & Thompson, 2018). Upticks in violence show that the armed conflict is
far from over. News reports in 2019 outline the ways in which the peace agreement has failed,
attributing much of this to the failure of the state to uphold promises and agreed upon
stipulations, such as subsidies and access to critical resources in neglected rural areas to
support education and wellbeing (Casey, 2019; Grattan, 2020). On the other hand, reports also
state that the FARC have also failed to meet terms of the agreement, including turning over
assets by a given deadline (Bocanegra, 2020).
Regardless, the conflict continues. Demobilized personnel, human rights leaders, and
civilians have been threatened, assassinated, and killed, while armed groups excluded from the
agreement establish themselves in areas previously controlled by the FARC (Maher &
Thompson, 2018; Casey, 2019; Grattan, 2020, Bocanegra, 2020; Cano, 2021; Rueda, 2021a;
Rueda, 2021b; WOLA, 2021). Buenaventura, the largest port city in the country for example,
gained international media attention for the significant uptick in homicides and intensified
presence of illegal armed groups in the past few months. Displaced and Afrodescendant
Colombians have been subjected to terror tactics and additional internal displacement in
addition to a lack of resources, sparking protests and violence (Alsema, 2021; Grattan, 2021,
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WOLA, 2021). Counter-narcotics efforts also continue to fail. With the current administration
still failing to support historically neglected communities, farmers without the capital to
cultivate legal crops have returned to coca production (Casey, 2019).
A critical part of this peace process is the truth commission, or the Comisión de la
Verdad, which was established in accordance with the 2017 Presidential Decree 588 (Laing,
2018; Comisión de la Verdad, 2020). In a 2018 state address, President Duque declared a
commitment to victims and investing a considerable budget into reparations (Presidencia de la
República, 2019). The Decree’s mandate charged the Comisión to establish an official space to
officially recognize human rights violations and impacts of armed conflict including effects on
society and the democratic process, paramilitarism, the connection between illicit crops and
conflict, and factors contributing to the persistence of violence, among others (Comisión, 2020).
Since its inception following the signing of the signed 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, the
Comisión has collected testimonies in various formats from ex-combatants, leaders, and
victims, particularly women and marginalized groups (Comisión, 2020; Romero, 2020). Critical
stories have come to light, including admissions of racially charged attacks from leaders of the
AUC and FARC, testifying that they did target Afro-descendant, Raizal, and Palenquera
communities, whom are members of the African Diaspora in Colombia (Aristizábal, 2020).
Additionally, they have updated reports of current incidents of violence (Colprensa, 2020;
Comisión, 2020; Romero, 2020).
Now, United States President Joe Biden is collaborating with President Duque to
continue close collaboration between Colombia and the United States (Suesca, 2021). In a
recent event hosted by the Atlantic Council, United States Senators Roy Blunt and Benjamin
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Carson were congratulatory towards Colombia’s lower rates of homicide in the last 20 years
and expressed hopes of “[strengthening the] bilateral partnership with Colombia” (Atlantic
Council, 2021). Consistent with sentiments expressed in hearing, Biden has supported the
reintroduction of aerial crop spraying, to which Duque has agreed (Hernandez & PayaresMontoya, 2020; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2021).
Overall, violence in Colombia continues and United States foreign aid only serves to
support harmful policing, illegal paramilitaries, and other detrimental measures such as aerial
spraying programs. At the time of finalizing this thesis in May 2021, Colombia is in the midst of
nationwide protests over President Duque’s withdrawal of critical tax reform. Protestors are
being met with extreme violence from national police and military forces in addition to severe
internet censorship (Daniels, 2021; Nugent, 2021; Pozzebon, 2021.; Sesin, 2021; Tucker, 2021).
State responses to protests clearly show the disregard for citizens’ lives and wellbeing, which
aligns with state and military actions throughout periods of ongoing conflict.

Case for Additional Research
My hope is that future projects will explore these connections together and in more
specific and regional contexts because it is important to understand the history of the conflict
and the relationship that the United states has with Colombia. Culture, identity, and food vary
drastically across the different regions in Colombia, which means that the experience of terror
and displacement is tied to place as well, and it would be a disservice to only discuss these
connections in a national context.
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I want to highlight the effects of Plan Colombia on Montes de Maria region of Colombia
(Figure 5) because it is a unique region because of its ecological diversity and because it is home
to large Afro-descendant and Indigenous communities- these characteristics which make it
particularly vulnerable to the types of external forces I have described.

Figure 5. Map of Montes de María Region of Colombia (WOLA, 2012)

From an ecological standpoint, the region is significant because of its biodiversity.
Considered an “agricultural food pantry” (Avila et al., 2017), the area is the site of cultivation
for many varieties of crops that are central to the country’s cuisine (Avila et al., 2017). This
landscape has drawn significant attention from transnational corporations (TNCs) due to its
fertility and abundance of underground resources. As such, it has shifted to become the
epicenter of civil warfare between leftist guerillas defending their land and villages and right-
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wing, government-supported paramilitary forces assisting in the eviction of peoples. In their
review of the business in Colombia, Hurtado Lozano et. al (2017) state:
The reduced costs of this agribusiness attracted the presence of illegal armed actors.
During the 1980s and 1990s, guerrilla organizations became untraceable entrepreneurs
of extortion and kidnappings. However, in 2000 the paramilitary groups imposed their
political and military power in flat areas where palm and banana plantations existed,
and cattle grazed. They also “taxed” local populations for their provision of security
(protection money): a practice made possible by the weak presence of government
institutions (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017: 450).
The expansion of oil palm plantations, as would be expected, has begun to affect food
production in the region, since the monocultures currently represent 47.1% of the total
cultivated land (Avila et al., 2017). As a result, many varieties of nutritional keystone crops,
which are responsible for providing most nutritional requirements for those living in the region,
have begun to disappear from local markets (Avila et al., 2017). According to the Department of
Social Prosperity and World Food Program’s food insecurity mapping system, over 73 percent
of municipalities in the department of Bolivar are at high risk of food insecurity. This is largely
due to the replacement of such food crops in favor of oil palm (Avila et al., 2017). I argue that
this is a key area to focus research, as the loss of keystone crops at the center of national and
regional foodways is not only a critical loss of biodiversity, but also a loss of cultural and
traditional agricultural knowledge.
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Conclusion
While much of the literature draws connections between palm oil and violence, Plan
Colombia and palm oil, and armed conflict and USAID investment, my results help to draw each
of these arguments together. Single factor ANOVA results suggest that, because there is a
significant difference in the means of all variables before, during, and after Plan Colombia’s
implementation, the USAID program helped to facilitate the expansion of palm oil plantations
and increased displacement. In short, the rapid expansion of palm oil hectarage alongside
increased violence and Plan Colombia was not coincidental. United States foreign aid allegedly
aimed at diminishing the drug trade ultimately provided funds for increased policing via the
national army and police force, as well as indirect funding for the paramilitary forces operating
alongside them and helped to violently clear people from their lands. Moreover, these newly
“abandoned” lands became prime targets for oil palm plantations, which began to grow rapidly
while displacement soared during Plan Colombia.
The testimonials gathered through the Comisión de la Verdad and current trials for
those answering for their crimes are creating the opportunity for a new era of accountability
and recognition for acts of terror. This thesis hopes to contribute to this new vein of the
conversation regarding armed conflict in Colombia by highlighting the connections between
commercial development for palm oil, displacement, and United States foreign aid.
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